Elected officials in the Brazilian Amazon have embraced the rhetoric of sustainable development, and most support programs that promote sustainable production paradigms. Nonetheless, most also continue to support investments in infrastructure that is known to drive deforestation.

Why might they pursue seemingly contradictory development pathways? Either they assume that sustainable practices will take root and development around the infrastructure will be benign, or they do not understand the connection between the two types of initiatives, or they doubt the value of sustainable options and are hedging their bets, or they are trying to please all of their constituents, which of course is the most likely explanation for any politician’s behaviour. Evidence of their willingness to play both sides of this debate can be found in their budgets, their strategic development plans and, of course, in their public statements.

Perhaps the most conspicuous practitioner of this political strategy is the current governor of Pará, Helder Barbalho (2019–present). On the green side of his agenda is a commitment to eliminate all forms of illegal deforestation by 2025 and his enthusiasm for developing the state’s bioeconomy, particularly the cultivation of açaí. As host of the COP30 international climate conference in Belém in 2025, Helder hopes to highlight these initiatives as part of Brazil’s contribution to the global effort to fight climate change. This vision is also manifest in the states’ twenty-year strategic development plan, which foresees a diversified economy with a broad spectrum of production systems and a commitment to environmental conservation.

On the not-so-green side of the governor’s agenda is his support for legal forms of forest clearing and the expansion of mining and agribusiness. The governor is a strong advocate for investment in bulk transport systems, including construction of the Ferrovia ParaenseMINAM in the southeast and the Ferrogrão (EF-171) in the southwest, as well as the expansion of port facilities and grain terminals on the Tapajós, Tocantins and Amazon rivers. The strategic planning document reinforces this vision by projecting a tripling of the production of mineral ores by 2030 and doubling of exports by an expansion of value-added, energy-intensive metallurgical industries. Rather than diversifying the state’s economy, however, the proposed strategy would increase the mining sector’s contribution to GDP from 25 to 35 per cent, while expanding its spatial footprint from 55 to 89 municipalities.

Successive administrations in Mato Grosso have been intensely focused on expanding the state’s industrial agriculture economy by adding value to commodity supply chains and diversifying its agribusiness models. This includes investment in the regional highway network, as well as construction of the Ferrogrão and other rail lines (EF-354 and EF-364), which will reduce logistical costs and make the state’s grain producers more competitive (see Chapter 2). Elected officials and business leaders are fully aware that overseas consumers perceive the state’s producers to be a major cause of deforestation, and they pursue strategies to protect their producers from international boycotts. The state, which once had the highest deforestation rates in Brazil (1977–2005), radically reduced forest loss between 2007 and 2012, when state agencies began to enforce environmental laws by using remote sensing technology to identify landholdings where forest vegetation had been cleared illegally. Although these policies were successful in identifying infringers, the state has been less successful in collecting the fines and levies stipulated by federal and state regulations.

Enforcement of environmental legislation and political trends in the Brazilian Amazon

Environmental law enforcement was relaxed in 2019 after the election of the current governor (Mauro Mendes), who aligned himself with the Bolsonaro administration and declared his support for a legislative proposal (PL-337) to exclude Mato Grosso from the regulatory entity known as the ‘Legal Amazon’. If enacted, the law would allow landholders to clear a greater proportion of native vegetation and escape legal responsibility for past transgressions.

In contrast, the state of Acre adopted policies to promote a ‘forest economy’ between 2000 and 2018, when the Viana brothers sought to build on the legacy of Chico Mendes by expanding the state’s network of sustainable-use reserves. They also supported the demarcation of Indigenous territories and established a payment for ecosystem services (PES) system that rewarded landholders for conserving remnant forests. Despite their efforts, however, the beef industry continued to dominate the regional economy, with a cattle herd that grew at about five per cent annually between 2000 and 2018.  Although deforestation slowed between 2007 and 2012, it was always a consistent component of regional land use.

Voters eventually turned to politicians more openly committed to conventional development, and in 2018 they elected the current governor (Gladson Cameli), an unabashed supporter of the beef industry and proponent of construction of the Rodovia Binacional, the proposed highway between the Cameli’s home town, Cruzeiro do Sul, and the Peruvian border. Planning for the highway was halted, however, when a federal court ordered the government to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of the Indigenous communities that would be affected by the controversial highway.[iv] Despite the change in political philosophy, the Cameli administration continues to support numerous state-sponsored programmes to foster conservation and subsidize forest communities, demonstrating that the legacy of Chico Mendes retains popular support within the state and the tendency of politicians to promise everything to everybody.

The elected officials of Amazonas state likewise seek to invest in both sustainable and conventional components of the regional economy. On the green side of the ledger are programmes to promote certified forest management and agroforestry, fisheries and aquaculture, and ecotourism, all of which build on the state’s history of creating Reservas de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (RDS)[2] within the state’s system of protected areas.  The state’s most successful programme is the community-based management of pirarucu (Arapaima gigas), a once-endangered fish whose populations have recovered and increased by more than 600 per cent after decades of overexploitation by commercial fisheries.

The programme, which was pioneered by the Instituto de Desenvolvimento Sustentável Mamirauá, was recently expanded to 25 municipalities, where it will generate economic benefits for more than 7,500 families.

A more controversial programme is the effort to repave BR-319, which, its proponents argue, will benefit regional commerce by creating a year-round terrestrial link between Manaus and the rest of Brazil. The highway has the support of the current governor (Wilson Lima), who was once a member of the Partido Verde (2012–2016) and allied with Marina Silva (2018). The governor contends that the controversial road can be developed as ‘green highway’, with special measures to avoid land grabbing and deforestation. Unsurprisingly, opponents are sceptical that authorities will follow through on this commitment, particularly considering proposals to build two entirely new roads that would link BR-319 to villages on the Madeira (Borba/AM-3549) and Purus (Tapauá/AM-366) rivers. Another attempt to balance both green and conventional economic models was the recent approval of the Licença do Instalação for a potash mine in Autazes. The licence was approved after the mine owner (Brazil Potash) obtained support from local Indigenous leaders. Opponents, however, contend that the agreements did not comply with protocols to obtain the ‘free, prior and informed consent’ of all local Indigenous communities.

Plans and contradictions in other Amazonian states

The remaining Amazonian states all have strategic planning offices replete with sustainability pledges, but none has published an integrated plan that might indicate how they would achieve their goals. Authorities in Rondônia emphasise the value of logistical infrastructure on the Madeira waterway, while supporting the diversification of small farmer production systems and the (long-delayed) effort to finish the land-tenure certification process. Maranhão has largely eradicated its native forest and now its Cerrado landscapes are being incorporated into the soy-maize production region known as MATOPIBA. Authorities in Tocantins likewise seek to expand agribusiness and support upstream expansion of the Tocantins Waterway as a bulk transport system. Roraima has an unusually strong constituency that supports wildcat gold mining, while its civic leaders voice aspirations for the expansion of agribusiness; Indigenous organisations vehemently oppose conventional development, but their constituents represent less than fifteen per cent of voters, a statistic that may drop over the short term as the state’s long-dormant colonization landscapes attract a new influx of settlers.

Municipalities

Municipal governments in the Legal Amazon are as diverse as the region itself, ranging from places like Campos de Julio (Mato Grosso), a vast soybean field on the border between the Amazonian and Cerrado biomes, and Canaã dos Carajás (Pará). In contrast, the frontier community of Novo Progresso (Pará) is largely inhabited by pioneers, many of whom are land grabbers (grileiros), while the prosperous town of Arequimes (Rondônia) is surrounded by small farms established in the 1970s. Large in area but sparsely populated are municipalities inhabited by Indigenous people (Santa Isabel do Rio Negro, Amazonas), Ribeirinha communities of the Amazon floodplain (Gurupá, Pará) and families living in extractive reserves (Xapuri, Acre).

Like politicians everywhere, elected officials reflect the aspirations of their constituents.

For example, the prefeito (mayor) of Itaituba, Pará, is a former miner who now controls the municipal agency that approves the environmental licences for small-scale gold miners. He claims the licensing process motivates miners to improve their operations and that most miners aspire to convert their mining camps into legally constituted communities, in order to qualify for programs to improve schools and health care facilities. The prefeito of São Felix do Xingu, Pará has repeatedly impeded the expulsion of land grabbers from the Terra Indígena Apyterewa, actions broadly supported by the inhabitants of the municipality that has the highest rates of deforestation and land gabbing in Brazil.

Some elected officials participate in or lead illegal actions, such as the prefeito of Humaitá, Amazonas, who joined a mob of disaffected gold miners that set fire to IBAMA’s offices after Operação Ouro Fino, a police action that decommissioned 37 barges on the Rio Madeira in 2017. The mayor, four city council members and two deputies to the state legislature subsequently convened a meeting with environmental authorities that led to a temporary suspension of enforcement activities. IBAMA prevailed and terminated illegal mining operations on a federal waterway, but tensions remain high and miners again resorted to civil disobedience to pressure authorities to allow what they consider to be a legitimate economic activity.

There are, of course, elected officials who support conservation initiatives, particularly if they have the good fortune to host a prime tourist destination such as Novo Airão and Barcelos (Amazonas), or Alter do Chão near Santarém (Pará), or where Indigenous people constitute an absolute majority, such as São Gabriel de Rio Negro (Amazonas). The inhabitants of the Amazon have an innate understanding that they benefit from nature. Nonetheless, most also support individual infrastructure projects that benefit their communities and the conventional production systems upon which they depend. 

Banner image: The community-based management of Pirarucu (Arapaima gigas), a once-endangered fish whose populations have recovered by more than 600% after decades of overexploitation by commercial fisheries. The programme consists of zoning floodplain lakes into ‘reserves’ and ‘harvest’ areas. The programme has not only stabilised populations but led to an increase in the harvest as the mean size of captured fish has increased by almost 50% over the last two decades. <style=”font-size: 12pt;”>Credit: Bernardo Oliveira / Instituto Juruá

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AgricultureAmazon BiodiversityBiodiversityConservationDeforestationEnvironmental PoliticsGovernanceIndigenous PeoplesInfrastructureLoggingProtected AreasThreats To RainforestsBrazilLatin AmericaSouth America

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