- The endemic corruption that infests governmental institutions makes political nepotism particularly dangerous. Most political clans operate within local and regional jurisdictions where influential families control important economic entities, media outlets and political parties.
- In Brazil, the most notable example of political nepotism is the clan presided over by Jader Fontenelle Barbalho. His populist rhetoric and skills as a tactician led to his election as governor in 1983, followed by an appointment in 1988 as minister for agricultural development.
- family-based political machines operate in all states of the Legal Amazon and, with few notable exceptions, support conventional development paradigms.
The family is a cornerstone of Latin America culture. In the prototypical family, members reside in close proximity to one another and rely on a multigenerational nuclear family for emotional and economic support. The extended family is also important and is often the primary network individuals use to gain access to social, educational and professional opportunities. In most cases, the support of the family is an unalloyed asset.
Family traditions are key to continuity of the artisanal and technical trades where children learn a craft from a parent; likewise, they predominate among professional guilds where younger generations tend to pursue the vocation of the previous generation(s). Inheritance is a fundamental property right and few question the ethics of individuals operating multi-generational farms, or the tradition of passing a small or medium-scale enterprise from parent to offspring. The reliance on family as an employment agency is less wise for larger companies and the most successful family-owned corporations recruit professionals to operate their businesses. Proponents of family-owned corporations, however, argue they pursue better strategic planning because they are driven by long-term goals, shared visions and values, which include a commitment to invest in the communities where they operate.
None of those explanations is valid, however, when family connections provide preferential access to the civil service, which engenders the same negative attributes as political patronage. Some argue that the same is not true for elected officials because of the intervention of voters, but that rationalization only holds when the election is ‘free and fair’ and, even then, there is an electoral advantage associated with name recognition and tribal politics. Political families are not unique to Latin America, and the exercise of political power is a genuine skill learned by ambitious children. Not infrequently, the progeny are more adept at governing than their forebears. Nevertheless, the endemic corruption that infests governmental institutions makes political nepotism particularly dangerous. Most political clans operate within local and regional jurisdictions where influential families control important economic entities, media outlets and political parties. They naturally seek to dominate the electoral process and capture administrative functions for their personal (and familial) benefit.
In Brazil, the most notable example of political nepotism is the clan presided over by Jader Fontenelle Barbalho. He began his political career during the 1970s by participating in both state and national legislatures as a member of the so-called ‘opposition’ party that was tolerated by the military regime. His populist rhetoric and skills as a tactician led to his election as governor in 1983, followed by an appointment in 1988 as Ministro de Desarrolho Agrário, which gave him control of INCRA during the heyday of the Amazonia land rush. This was a position of true power, which he allegedly used to finance his campaign for a second term as governor in 1991, and to build what eventually became an exceptionally large portfolio of landholdings. He was eventually accused of inflating the cost of dozens of fazendas between 1988 and 1990 as part of a programme to expropriate land for redistribution to landless peasants. The alleged criminal conduct was exposed in 2003, by which time he was once again an elected official, causing the case to be transferred from the criminal court to a privileged forum presided over by the Supremo Tribunal Federal, where it languished until the statute of limitations caused its dismissal in 2015.
Jader Barbalho was also implicated as the mastermind of the SUDAM embezzlement scheme (1997–2000), which involved skimming tens. By now an influential senator, Barbalho’s role was so obvious he was forced to surrender his position as Senate president in 2000. He eventually resigned from the Senate to avoid impeachment proceedings (cassação de mandato) that would have made him ineligible for public office for life. He returned to the Senate in 2011, assuming an influential role as a leader on the Bancada Ruralista and as a strategic ally of President Rousseff – until he voted for her impeachment in 2016.
As an influential member of the PMDB (now MDB), he allegedly played a leadership role in the organization of the Lava Jato scandal. The attorney general made the first formal accusation in 2016, accusing him of accepting R$30 million in bribes to facilitate the construction of the Belo Monte hydropower complex. This was followed by a broader indictment naming him and seven other senior members of his party for organising the reception of R$ 867 million in bribes, kickbacks and illegal campaign contributions. As usual, the Tribunal Federal Supremo (TFS) proceeded slowly, during which time Barbalho worked to support the campaign of Inácio Lula da Silva in 2022 and served on the transition team following the election. The TFS dismissed the charges against the senator and his alleged co-conspirators in March 2023.
Numerous other members of the Barbalho family have held elected office or appointments in local, regional and national institutions (Table 6.3). The best known scion of the younger generation is Helder, who served as mayor of Pará’s second-largest municipality before running for governor in 2014. He lost that election and was accused of soliciting an illegal campaign contribution from a subsidiary of the Odebrecht conglomerate. As an influential member of the PMDB, Helder was appointed to a series of ministerial posts in the Rousseff and Temer administrations and ran (and won) again in 2018 for governor of Pará.
Helder Barbalho’s government has been notable because he presents himself as a spokesperson for a scientific approach to policy. He has been outspoken in his support for COVID vaccinations and climate change initiatives, while steadfastly supporting legal forms of mining and agriculture. As a so-called green governor, he has committed to reducing carbon emissions by 45 per cent by 2035 and been a vocal advocate of President Lula’s social agenda, as well as backing proposals to explore for oil in the region referred to as the Equatorial Margin. Helder Barbalho won reelection in 2022 with more than 70% of the vote.
Another well-known political clan revolves around a former senator from Roraima, Romero Jucá. He began his political career in his home state of Pernambuco, but moved to Brasília in the early 1980s, where he was nominated to head the Projeto Rondon, a volunteer service dedicated to the colonisation of the Amazon. He then served as president of the Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI), where he focused his attention on Roraima, his future home and political fiefdom. His administration of FUNAI provoked multiple investigations into allegations of bribery, embezzlement and trafficking in illegal timber. His most harmful act, however, was a betrayal of trust in his fundamental obligation to protect Indigenous people from the ravages of frontier society.
In 1987, he arbitrarily modified the borders of the recently created Yanomami Indigenous Territory, reducing its size by 75 per cent and dividing it into nineteen disconnected units. In the excised areas, he facilitated the entry of some 40,000 garimpeiros, while expelling missionaries and NGOs then providing health care to recently contacted Indigenous communities. These deliberate actions directly caused the death of an estimated 25 per cent of the Yanomami population and were categorised as a human rights violation by the Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Social activists view his actions as a crime against humanity and, quite possibly, a form of genocide.
Jucá was rewarded for his pro-development policies in 1988 by being named governor of the federal territory of Roraima during its transition to full statehood. He lost the race for governor in 1990, but his first wife, Teresa Surita, was elected mayor of Boa Vista in 1992, and together they organized a political machine with a chameleon-like ability to support the political parties of the moment. Jucá was elected to the Senate in 1995, but in the interim started a poultry farm that collapsed soon after initiating operations. An audit conducted during the SUDAM scandals of the late 1990s revealed he used phantom properties as collateral for a loan from the Banco de Amazonas. Like many criminal cases involving senators, it was dismissed by the Supremo Tribunal Federal on procedural grounds in 2008.
Jucá financed his political activities, in part, via the Fundação de Promoção Social e Cultural do Estado de Roraima, a non-profit organisation purportedly dedicated to assisting Indigenous people; coincidentally, the federal programme sponsoring that foundation was created by legislation sponsored by the senator. The director of the foundation, a Jucá confidant, diverted money intended for health care for Indigenous communities into entities associated with the Jucá political machine. This case led to legal action, but the perpetrators avoided prosecution because investigators had obtained evidence without a search warrant.
Elected to three Senate terms, Jucá leveraged his seniority to obtain cabinet positions in the administrations of Lula da Silva (Previdência Social no Brasil) and Temer (Ministério do Planejamento). During his tenure, he repeatedly introduced legislation that would allow mining on Indigenous lands, most notably in 2012 when a company controlled by his daughter, Marina, filed a permit to mine for gold in Indigenous lands in Roraima. His son, Rodrigo, was elected to the state assembly in 2010 and ran unsuccessfully in 2014 in a campaign partly funded by contributions from Odebrecht.
Roman Jucá and Teresa Surita divorced in the 1990s, but they remain political allies. She has been elected to five terms as mayor of Boa Vista, and has served in Congress and as secretary in the Urban Ministry. She has been widely lauded for her work promoting municipal governance and advancing social issues related to women’s rights but has also been implicated in price rigging for garbage collection and public works contracts during her tenure as mayor.
Both Jucá and Surita have children with other partners. Apparently, relations among their offspring are close enough for them to organise a business venture that defrauded the state by selling an over-priced landholding (R$ 32 million) for a Minha Casa Minha Vida housing project on the outskirts of Boa Vista. The company building the housing units (Odebrecht) had contributed to the reelection campaign of Senator Jucá, who, like his colleague Jader Barbalho, was a central figure in the Lava Jato corruption network. Romero Jucá lost his reelection bid in 2019, but maintains his position as a member of the MDB’s National Executive Committee and chair of its Roraima branch.
The Barbalhos and Jucás are the most infamous political clans in the Brazilian Amazon, but they are not unique. Similar family-based political machines operate in all states of the Legal Amazon and, with few notable exceptions, support conventional development paradigms. In Bolivia, the Fernández family dominates politics in Santa Cruz, while Keiko Fujimori controls the largest bloc in the Peruvian Congress. Several recent Colombian presidents (Pastrana and Santos) are descended, directly or indirectly, from former Colombian chief executives, and Ecuador’s president is the son of a prominent politician and former presidential hopeful.
Featured image: View from the summit of Saco do Mamangua, Brazil. Image by Rhett A. Butler.
“A Perfect Storm in the Amazon” is a book by Timothy Killeen and contains the author’s viewpoints and analysis. The second edition was published by The White Horse in 2021, under the terms of a Creative Commons license (CC BY 4.0).
To read earlier chapters of the book, find Chapter One here, Chapter Two here, Chapter Three here, Chapter Four here and Chapter Five here.
Chapter 6. Culture and demographic defines the present
Credits
